Risk perceptions of cyber-security and precautionary behaviour by van Schaik, Paul et al.
1/50 
 
Risk perceptions of cyber-security and precautionary behaviour 
 
Please cite this article as: van Schaik P., Jeske D., Onibokun J., Coventry L., Jansen 
J. & Kusev P., Risk perceptions of cyber-security and precautionary behaviour, 
Computers in Human Behavior (2017), doi: 10.1016/j.chb.2017.05.038. 
Paul van Schaika,*, Debora Jeskeb, Joseph Onibokunc, Lynne Coventryd, Jurjen 
Jansene and Petko Kusevf 
aTeesside University, School of Social Sciences, Business and Law, Middlesbrough, 
United Kingdom 
bUniversity College Cork, School of Applied Psychology, Cork, Ireland 
cThe Union Company, Union Digital, Edinburgh, United Kingdom 
dUniversity of Northumbria at Newcastle, Psychology and Communication 
Technology Lab, Newcastle, United Kingdom 
eUniversity of Applied Sciences, Lectoraat Cybersafety, Leeuwarden, Netherlands 
fUniversity of Huddersfield, Huddersfield Business School, Huddersfield, United 
Kingdom 
*corresponding author 
E-mail addresses: p.van-schaik@tees.ac.uk (P. van Schaik), d.jeske@ucc.ie (D. 
Jeske), joseph.onibokun@union.co.uk (J. Onibokun), 
lynne.coventry@northumbria.ac.uk (L. Coventry), J.Jansen@nhl.nl (J. Jansen), 
p.kusev@hud.ac.uk (P. Kusev). 
2/50 
 
Risk perceptions of cyber-security and precautionary behaviour 
Abstract 
A quantitative empirical online study examined a set of 16 security hazards on the 
Internet and two comparisons in 436 UK- and US students, measuring perceptions of 
risk and other risk dimensions.  First, perceived risk was highest for identity theft, 
keylogger, cyber-bullying and social engineering.  Second, consistent with existing 
theory, significant predictors of perceived risk were voluntariness, immediacy, 
catastrophic potential, dread, severity of consequences and control, as well as 
Internet experience and frequency of Internet use.  Moreover, control was a 
significant predictor of precautionary behaviour.  Methodological implications 
emphasise the need for non-aggregated analysis and practical implications 
emphasise risk communication to Internet users. 
Keywords 
risk perception; precautionary behaviour; information security; cyber-security; non-
aggregate data analysis 
Highlights 
We studied students’ responses to security hazards on the Internet 
Students perceived identity theft as the riskiest hazard 
Perceived risk was predicted by specific risk dimensions and use habits  
Precautionary behaviour was predicted by students’ perceived control 
This work has implications for data analysis and risk communication to students
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Risk perceptions of cyber-security and precautionary behaviour 
       
       
Risk variation among security hazards  Hazard perception predicting perceived risk 
       
Identity theft on the Internet  High  Severity (hazard-specific) 
Perceived risk 
Keylogger  
Perceived 
risk 
 Severity (over hazards) 
Cyber-bullying   Catastrophic potential (hazard-specific) 
Social engineering   Dread (over hazards) 
Virus   Voluntariness (over hazards) 
Phishing   Internet experience 
Virtual stalking   Voluntariness (hazard-specific) 
Botnet   Control (hazard-specific) 
Spyware   Frequency of Internet logon 
Rogueware   Catastrophic potential (over hazards)   
Trojan   Immediacy (over hazards) 
Zero-day attack    
 
Catfishing      
Information-sharing on social media      
Internet surveillance      
E-mail-harvesting   Hazard perception predicting precautionary behaviour 
Cookie      
Browsing Internet sites for information  Low  Control (anti-virus software use)  Computer security use (anti-virus) 
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1 Introduction 
Citizens are using the Internet (e.g., e-mail and the World Wide Web) more and 
more1.  This Internet use2 can increasingly lead to violations of security by criminals 
(Schneier, 2015).  In particular, cyber-security is the protection of cyberspace as well 
as individuals and organizations that function within cyberspace and their assets in 
that space (Von Solms & Van Niekerk, 2013).  Various hazards (i.e., situations with 
the potential to do harm) exist to computer users’ information and pose risks to 
cyber-security.  These include user surveillance, identity theft, phishing, viruses, 
spyware, trojans, and keyloggers (for details, see Appendix 1).  As a result of 
extensive press coverage regarding corporate privacy and security disasters (Clarke, 
2016; Garg, 2016), many users are exposed to information about these hazards.  
However, some hazards may be newer, less known and receive less coverage. 
When we consider means to improve cyber-security, the nature of the hazards and 
the requisite countermeasures are one aspect that requires deliberation. Another 
aspect that needs attention is users’ engagement with these and their perceptions of 
risk (Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Slovic, 1987; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Jansen & 
Van Schaik, 2016).  Moreover, people adapt their behaviour based on how much risk 
they are willing to take (Workman, Bommer & Straub, 2008).  Risk perceptions play a 
fundamental role in models as predictors of precautionary behaviour (Huang, Rau, 
Salvendy, Gao & Zhou, 2011; Boss, Galletta, Lowry, Moody & Polak, 2015).  
Precautions include the use of computer security software (e.g., anti-virus software, 
firewall software and anti-spyware software). 
Research has demonstrated that students are lax about security, particularly in terms 
of mobile devices (Jones & Heinrichs, 2012; Tan & Aguilar, 2012).  It is unlikely that 
their lack of precautions and knowledge gaps will disappear when graduates enter 
into the labour market.  Therefore, the aim of this research is to study students’risk 
perceptions in Internet use, in relation to security.  Our goals are to (1) determine 
how different potential security-related hazards on the Internet are perceived, (2) 
establish to what extent students take precautions (Kusev, Van Schaik, Ayton, Dent 
& Chater, 2009; Van Schaik, Kusev & Juliusson, 2011) against different potential 
security-related hazards, and (3) ascertain the antecedents of risk perception and 
precautionary security behaviour.  Various approaches to studying risk have been 
developed and are reviewed next. 
2 Theoretical approaches to studying risk perception 
A number of theoretical approaches are available to understand how risk perceptions 
may be shaped by the context related to risk.   
                                            
1 http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/   
2 Internet use describes the use of interconnected computerized networks, including the commercial 
and social platforms and applications that are running on these appliances. 
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Risk compensation model.  Adams’ (1988, 2012) conceptual risk compensation aims 
to explain human risk-taking behaviour as balancing between (non-monetary) costs 
and benefits.  On the one hand, propensity to risk-taking is influenced by baseline 
propensity to risk-taking (individual ‘risk thermostat’), which differs between 
individuals, and by potential rewards of a particular risk-taking behaviour.  On the 
other hand, risk perception is influenced by the direct or indirect experience of losses 
from risk as a result of a particular risk-taking behaviour and voluntariness of risk 
(with greater perceived voluntariness resulting in lower perceived risk).  Actual risk-
taking behaviour is then influenced by both propensity to risk-taking and risk 
perception.  Interventions that do not change risk propensity cannot reduce risk-
taking behaviour because individuals will strive to restore the balance according to 
their risk thermostat. Several aspects play a role when studying risk perception. 
The presentation of risk information.  According to Gigerenzer, Todd et al. (1999), 
human decision-making is constrained by people’s cognitive limitations and the 
structure of the environment, and a risk is an uncertainty that can be expressed as a 
number (e.g., probability or frequency) derived from empirical data.  In particular, the 
aim has been to change the structure and experience of the environment by 
presenting information so that people’s risk perception (more) closely matches 
empirical frequency.  However, Gigerenzer et al.’s (1999) approach cannot be 
readily applied to the domain of online security and privacy risks, as empirical data of 
security breaches are usually non-existent or unreliable (Schneier, 2015). 
Availability of risk information.  Kahneman (2011, p. 129) stresses the essential role 
of availability of information (“the ease with which instances come to mind”), which 
influences an individual’s risk perception.  Availability, and thereby risk perception 
based on this, can be enhanced by saliency (the extent to which an event attracts 
attention), the dramatic nature of an event (e.g., a plane crash) and source of 
experience (personal experiences result in increased availability). 
Affect in risk perception.  According to the affect heuristic, the more technologies or 
activities that are associated with positive feelings, the less they are judged to be 
risky and the more they are judged to be beneficial (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic & 
Johnson, 2000).  Therefore, if people associate an activity (e.g., smoking or fracking) 
with positive feelings then they will judge the activity to be harmless and beneficial. 
Revealed risk-related preferences.  Starr (1969) used population statistics of human 
behaviour to infer people’s (revealed) risk preferences regarding particular 
technologies and human activities.  He analysed the relationship between risk (the 
statistical expectation of death per hour of exposure) and benefit (the average 
amount of money spent per individual participant or the average contribution made to 
a participant’s annual income) for some common activities.  However, the approach 
of revealed preferences suffers from several shortcomings.  First, preferences may 
not be stable over time and aggregate data do not take into account the variability 
among hazards (Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, & Combs, 1978).  Second, the 
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underlying assumption that people have both full information and use that 
information optimally has been refuted (Simon, 1956).  Third, different measures of 
risk and benefit lead to different conclusions (Fischhoff et al., 1978). 
Expressed risk preferences.  Psychometric methods have been used to study 
(expressed) preferences regarding particular technologies and human activities 
(Slovic, 1987).  This has the advantage of eliciting perceptions (thoughts and 
judgments) of risk from people who are (potentially) exposed to particular risks that 
are studied, and can provide information about the causes of behaviour and potential 
ways to influence this.  Applications of the results of research using these methods 
include risk communication (Fife-Schaw & Rowe, 1996; Garg & Camp, 2012; 2015; 
Young, Kuo & Chiang, 2014; Kim, Choi, Lee, Cho, & Ahn, 2015) and risk policy 
(Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, 1982; Huang, Ban, Sun, Han, Yuan & Bi, 2013). 
Prediction equations of risk perception from a set of risk dimensions (e.g., 
voluntariness, controllability and newness; see Online Supplementary Material 
OSM1) have been developed (Fischhoff et al., 1978).  A limitation is that data are 
usually averaged over hazards.  Therefore, the effect of or variability in hazards 
cannot be analysed, with (other) predictors held constant, and the analysis may not 
predict risk perceptions for individual hazards.  Moreover, there is an apparent lack 
of research showing how risk perceptions ‘translate’ into behaviour. 
The current research combines the study of expressed preferences and revealed 
preferences.  This enables us to pursue our goals: to quantify variation among 
hazards, and to predict risk perception and precautionary behaviour. 
3 Background to the current study 
Risk perception and precautionary behaviour in relation to cyber-security.  As 
highlighted in Section 1, students are an important user group to study in terms of 
cyber-security.  It is important to improve the awareness of one’s susceptibility and 
fallibility to risk, and thereby increase the likelihood of online users consulting 
appropriate information sources to make better information security decisions.  
Therefore, we need to study students’ risk perceptions in relation to cyber-security in 
order to understand where the knowledge gaps are that employers may need to 
tackle upon recruitment of recent graduates.  Thus,  
Research Question 1: how do university students perceive different online 
information security-related hazards in terms of risk, benefit, and other risk 
dimensions (cf., Fischhoff et al., 1978)? 
According to Öğütçü, Testik and Chouseinoglou’s (2016) results, students, 
academics and administrators differ in terms of online activities (such as using social 
media), which may expose users to cyber-security hazards.  Öğütçü et al. (2016) 
noted that exposure to hazards was highest in students although they also engaged 
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in more precautionary behaviour (for instance, using anti-virus software) while risk 
perception tended to be lowest among administrators.  Therefore, 
Research Question 2: to what extent do university students take precautions against 
online information security-related hazards? 
Predicting risk perception. Previous research has proposed various risk dimensions 
(see Online Supplementary Material OSM1) as predictors of perceived risk that are 
also relevant to the current study.  In particular, voluntary activities are perceived as 
less risky3 (Starr, 1969).  Therefore, for example, the more voluntary people believe 
exposure to the risks associated with phishing (the act of sending an e-mail to a user 
falsely claiming to be an established legitimate enterprise) is, the less risky they 
perceive phishing to be.  When positive effects are immediate and negative 
consequences of an activity are delayed perceived risk is reduced (Kahneman, 
2011).  For example, the effect of a ‘dormant’ computer virus on the integrity of a 
computer system may only become apparent in the longer term.  Knowledge by 
population affected is also a potential predictor, as people’s risk perception is 
reduced when they believe they understand the underlying risks (e.g., in social-
media use; Garg & Camp, 2015).  In addition, the perceived knowledge by experts, 
or the effectiveness of systems that are seen as expert, also influences non-experts’ 
risk perception and their behaviours (e.g., in social-media use; Garg & Camp, 2015).  
According to Adams (2012), when people believe they are in control, their perception 
of risk is reduced.  Therefore, when people’s perceived control over potential 
information security breaches is increased, their perceived risk is reduced (Rhee, 
Ryu & Kim, 2012).  Because of the newness of some risks, people may exaggerate 
these (e.g., genetically modified foods).  In particular, various pieces of information 
shared online may be combined; this may substantially increase risks to security 
(Schneier, 2015) and such new risks may not be acceptable to the public (Malin & 
Sweeney, 2001).   
Moreover, people’s perceptions of more common risks are normally reduced, while 
uncommon risks evoke dread (Fishhoff et al., 1978).  In modern society, Internet use 
is a common activity, for example because of its efficiency; however, reliable data on 
risks to security are not readily available (Garg & Camp, 2015; Schneier, 2015).  
Activities or technologies with greater catastrophic potential, where many people are 
affected in a single event, are perceived as riskier, even though other activities that 
affect fewer people per event may overall impact more people per year (Adams, 
2012; Mumpower, Shi, Stoutenborough & Vedlitz, 2013).  For example, people 
overestimate the risk of terrorist attacks, but underestimate the risk of traffic 
accidents (Adams, 2012) and exposure to cyber-security hazards (LaRose, Rifon & 
                                            
3 Behaviours may be considered risky when engaging in a behaviour may increase the exposure to 
danger, harm or loss that may impact the individual user, their immediate network, or all users 
regardless of their personal connection to the individual user engaging in this behaviour. The 
hazards in our study each represent such sources of danger, harm or precursors of loss (e.g., in 
terms of personal data, finances, identity). 
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Enbody, 2008).  Risks that are perceived to have more severe consequences are 
perceived to be riskier.  For example, severity of consequences predicted perceived 
risk of water poisoning, nuclear device, airline attack and bomb (Mumpower et al., 
2013).  Moreover, perceptions of the severity of a security breach through hacking 
predicted perceived risk of online shopping in younger and older adults 
(Chakraborty, Lee, Bagchi-Sen, Upadhyaya & Raghav Rao, 2016). 
According to the affect heuristic (Finucane et al., 2000), technologies that are 
perceived to be more beneficial are also perceived to be less risky and vice versa 
either because both are consequents of affect or because affect is a mediator.  
Therefore, perceived benefit is a potential predictor of perceived risk after taking into 
account the effect of affect.  In cyber-security, insider threats can be explained by the 
affect heuristic (Farahmand & Spafford, 2013).  In addition, demographic variables 
have previously been found to be predictors of risk perceptions (Bronfman, Cifuentes 
& Gutiérrez, 2008) and were therefore considered here for inclusion as candidate 
predictors (age, gender, education level, work status, years of experience in Internet 
use, and duration per Internet session).   
Applying risk perception prediction to cyber-security.  Furthermore, research in 
cyber-security has empirically studied risk dimensions (e.g., perceived control) as 
predictors of perceived risk.  Huang, Rau and Salvendy (2010) and Garg and Camp 
(2012) conducted work in relation to the current study by analysing the perception of 
risk in cyber-security.  Both studies analysed a set of hazards (21 and 15 
respectively in the two respective studies) on the Internet in terms of perceived risk 
and other risk dimensions.  They then used these risk dimensions to predict 
perceived risk. In Huang et al.’s (2010) results statistically significant predictors of 
risk were severity of consequences, scope of impacts, accident history, 
voluntariness, duration of impacts, understanding and possibility of exposure.  
According to Garg and Camp’s results (2012), statistically significant predictors of 
risk were voluntariness, knowledge to science, controllability, newness, dread and 
severity.  However, in both studies the data were collapsed over hazards in the 
regression analysis.  Therefore, these studies could not establish the degree of 
variance between hazards in risk perception (e.g., specific risk differences).  
However, this is important as people’s perceptions may differ depending on the 
information item that is at stake. Our study thus builds on a number of different 
pieces of literature, but also attempts to address certain analytical limitations.  
Therefore, 
Research Question 3: what are the antecedents of risk perception in cyber-security 
in university students?  Potential antecedents include voluntariness of activity, 
immediacy of consequences and others discussed above. 
Predicting precautionary behaviour.  Pattinson and Anderson (2005) noted the role 
of risk perception as a mediator in the relationship between risk communication and 
risk-taking behaviour in information security.  Vance, Eargle, Anderson and Brock 
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Kirwan (2014) tested the strength of risk perception as a predictor of information 
security behaviour.  Self-reported perceived risk was predictive of security 
behaviours only when security information was salient (through a simulated malware 
incident).  Furthermore, self-competence was a positive predictor of precautionary 
behaviour against attacks from a computer virus, in employees in different sectors 
(Mariani & Zappalà, 2014), although there was no evidence for the role of perceived 
risk. 
Moreover, the risk dimensions that predict perceived risk (discussed in relation to 
Research Question 3) are also potential predictors of precautionary behaviour.  
Previous research on risk perception supports this idea (Slovic, MacGregor & Kraus, 
1987; Sjöberg, 2000) and the role of demographics as predictors (Layte, McGee, 
Rundle & Leigh, 2007).  Thus, 
Research Question 4: what are the antecedents of precautions taken against risk in 
cyber-security in university students? 
Knowledge gaps.  In response to gaps in previous research (see above), first, the 
current study considers the degree to which hazards vary in terms of individuals’ 
(specifically, students’) cyber-security-related risk perceptions and precautionary 
behaviour.  Second, we research and identify several predictors of perceived 
security-related risks and precautionary behaviour online, linking our findings to the 
existing research in risk perception and cyber-security.  Third, we demonstrate the 
benefits of using non-aggregated data analysis to avoid methodological fallacies and 
derived recommendations for educating Internet users such as students in relation to 
cyber-security. 
4 Method 
4.1 Design and material 
An online-survey design was used.  The independent variable was cyber-security 
hazard, with 16 levels.  In addition, two further comparisons were included (browsing 
the Internet for information and information sharing on social media).  Previous 
research has predominantly recruited USA students; therefore, in order to establish 
the generality of the findings, we included both UK and USA students.  The 
dependent variables were perceived risk, perceived benefit, risk balance (risk score 
subtracted from benefit score; Bronfman & Cifuentes, 2003), perceptions of nine risk 
dimensions (see Section 3, Table 4 and Online Supplementary Material OSM1) and 
computer security use. 
4.2 Participants 
Respondents were 436 UK and USA university students (336 female, 100 male; 
mean age = 23, SD = 7; UK: n = 267 [students recruited from social-science and 
other courses at four universities]; USA: n = 169 [students recruited from social-
science courses at a Midwestern university]).  Participants received course credits or 
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were eligible to enter a prize draw (£50 or $50) as a reimbursement.  They were 
experienced Internet users (mean = 12 years, SD = 3) and used the Internet for 
various purposes, most notably e-mail (96.1%), social networking (91.3%), searching 
for work-related or study-related information (87.2%), and buying products or 
services (83.3%).  In terms of demographics, universities did not differ on gender, 
frequency of Internet use or average length of Internet session (p > .05), but differed 
on age and Internet experience (p < .001). 
4.3 Measures 
A set of 16 hazards and two comparisons (Table 1 and Appendix 1 for details) was 
compiled based on previous research (Garg & Camp, 2012).  For this research, the 
hazards were categorized and some hazards were added, such as zero-day attacks 
and cyber bullying and others deleted, such as spam and malware, to improve 
coverage and specificity.  The first 16 items were selected because they were 
considered to be important potential cyber-security hazards and were categorized as 
identity-related (2), monitoring (1), online social (4) and software (9).  In contrast, the 
last two were considered as relatively low-risk online activities and were included as 
comparisons.  The definition of each of the 18 hazards/comparisons was presented 
to participants in the questionnaire that was used for data collection (see Appendix 1 
for definitions; see Online Supplementary Material OSM1 for questionnaire).  This 
was to ensure that they would consider the intended meaning in their response to 
the questionnaire items. 
Perceived risk, benefit and nine risk dimensions were based on Fischhoff et al. 
(1978), and Bronfman, Cifuentes, Dekay and Willis (2007).  These dimensions were 
voluntariness, immediacy of effect, knowledge about risk by affected population, 
knowledge about risk by science, control over risk, newness, (chronic-)catastrophic 
potential, dread, and severity of consequences (see Online Supplementary Material 
OSM1 for details).  In response to each item (from the set of 16 hazards and 2 
comparisons [Table 1]), participants had to give a rating on 11 dimensions of risk 
perception, using a 7-point semantic-differential. 
We used and expanded the Computer Security Usage scale (CSU; Claar & Johnson, 
2012) to five items, with a 7-point Likert scale to measure precautionary behaviour 
against specific potential Internet security hazards.  In particular, these were taking 
protective measures through add-on anti-virus software, firewall software, 
antispyware software, software updates and security updates.  By engaging in this 
behaviour, computer users can reduce the likelihood of breaches due to software 
hazards such as virus infection from occurring.  Therefore, risk perceptions of 
specific software hazards may be predictive of computer security use.  
A principal component analysis with varimax rotation of the CSU produced a one-
component solution, and explained 65% of variance, with loadings ranging from 0.67 
to 0.82 (average = 0.80).  Internal-consistency reliability was good (Cronbach’s alpha 
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= 0.87).  On the scale, mean scores were calculated per participant and used in 
subsequent data analysis. 
4.4 Procedure 
Research ethics approval was obtained from the local research ethics committee at 
two universities.  The ethics approval at these two institutions was subsequently 
accepted by the additional institutions involved in data collection.  Students were 
recruited by e-mail, with a link to the online questionnaire.  Questions on 
demographics were presented first.  The next section included each of the 18 
hazards/comparisons.  Each hazard was presented individually and in randomized 
order to all participants.  For each hazard, participants answered 11 perception-
related questions on perceived risk, benefit, and nine additional risk dimensions (see 
above) in random order.  Finally, the CSU items were presented in random order. 
5 Results  
5.1 Analysis of hazards and precautionary behaviour 
In relation to Research Question 1, we analysed how different online information 
security-related hazards are perceived.  Confidence intervals of the mean (see Table 
2) for 16 hazards and 2 comparisons indicate that perceived risk was highest for 
identity theft, keylogger, cyber-bullying and social engineering, and lowest for 
browsing Internet sites for information and cookie.  The converse was true for risk 
balance (Table 3).  Preliminary mixed-measures analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) 
of the four UK samples was conducted.  Hazard was the within-subject independent 
variable, nation was the between-subjects variable and other demographics were 
covariates (age, gender, frequency of Internet use, average length of Internet 
session and years of Internet experience).  The results show that the sample did not 
have a significant main effect or interaction effect on perceived risk (p > .05).  The 
following analysis therefore combined the UK samples.   
With the same covariates, mixed-measures ANCOVA for the 16 hazards showed a 
small significant effect of hazard on risk perception (F (15, 6480) = 10.04, p < .001, 
partial eta squared = .02), a non-significant effect of nation (UK vs US) (F (1, 427) = 
2.58, p > .05, partial eta squared < .01) and a small significant interaction effect (F 
(15, 6480) = 6.14, p < .001, partial eta squared = .01).  The remaining covariates 
were not significant (p > .05).  Follow-up pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni 
correction and the same covariates showed the following significant differences: US-
students’ perceptions of risk were higher than UK-students’ perceptions for 
surveillance (partial eta squared = .03, small to moderate effect size, p <  .001) and 
cookie (.05/moderate/< .001), but lower for social engineering (.03/small to 
moderate/< .001).  Although the interaction effect was significant, the main finding 
regarding the comparison of the two nations is that overall the pattern of mean 
scores across hazards in both was clearly similar (see Figure 1); this is despite the 
small interaction effect that was inevitably statistically significant due to the large 
sample size (Field, 2013). 
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Analysis by nation showed that the effect of hazard on risk perception was small to 
moderate and significant in UK students (F (15, 3960) = 10.49, p < .001, partial eta 
squared = .04), but small and approaching significance in US students (F (15, 2520) 
= 1.43, p = .06, partial eta squared = .01).  None of the covariates were significant.  
Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction over the pooled samples showed 
that identity theft was generally perceived as riskiest (significantly riskier than 12 
other hazards in US students and nine other hazards in UK students).  Two hazards 
were generally perceived as the least risky: cookie (less risky than 15 other hazards 
in UK students and 14 other hazards in US students) and e-mail-harvesting (less 
risky than 13 other hazards in UK students and 12 other hazards in US students).  
Additional analysis showed that the comparison item browsing Internet sites was 
generally perceived as least risky in both UK and US students (but equally risky as 
cookie) and the comparison item information-sharing on social media was perceived 
as the second least risky (less risky than 12 other hazards in UK students and 8 
other the hazards in US students). 
Risk profiles were analysed per hazard, showing the mean for perceptions of risk, 
benefit, and the nine risk dimensions (Table 4).  Differences among hazards were 
greatest on perceived risk, perceived benefit, and severity of consequences (all 
partial eta squared = .02).  Mixed-measures ANCOVA showed that the effect of 
hazard was significant for all perceived-risk dimensions.  Again, the pattern of mean 
scores across the hazards was clearly similar, and the main effect of nation and its 
interaction with hazard were small (average partial eta squared = .01). 
In relation to Research Question 2, we analysed to what extent people take 
precautions against different online information security-related hazards.   
The level of precautionary behaviour (computer security use over the five 
behaviours) was relatively high (in comparison to the neutral scale value of 4, mean 
= 5.29, CI.95 = [5.13; 5.39]).  Computer security use was not significantly correlated 
(all p > .05) with average time per Internet session(r = -.02), Internet experience in 
years (r = .05), frequency of logging on to the Internet (r = .00), age (r = .04), gender 
(r = .01) or sample (UK vs US, r = .05). 
In an analysis of individual scale items, repeated-measures ANOVA showed a 
significant effect of individual computer security behaviour (F (4, 1740) = 27.11, p < 
.001, partial eta squared = .06).  Follow-up pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni 
correction showed that security behaviour was more frequent in terms of using anti-
virus software (mean = 5.35, SD = 1.84), installing operating-system software 
updates (mean = 5.52, SD = 1.52) and installing security-software updates (mean = 
5.53, SD = 1.70) than in terms of using add-on firewall software (mean = 5.04, SD = 
1.87) and anti-spyware software (mean = 4.88, SD = 1.94) (all six comparisons: p < 
.001). 
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5.2 Predicting perceived risk and precautionary behaviour 
In relation to Research Question 3, we analysed the antecedents of risk perception 
in online information security.  In the analysis of perceived risk, two levels can be 
distinguished: hazard (at Level 1, 16 hazards, corresponding with Internet security 
hazards, existed) and subject (or participant; at Level 2, 436 participants existed).  In 
relation to different analysis levels (non-aggregated [e.g., individual respondent] and 
aggregated [e.g., group]), Pedhazur (1997) points out that cross-level inferences 
(interpreting the results obtained at one level [e.g., group] to apply to another [e.g., 
individual]) “may be, and most often are, fallacious and grossly misleading” (p.  677).  
Similarly, Tabachnick and Fidell (2013) discuss the ecological fallacy: analysing only 
aggregated data (at a higher level) and then interpreting the results at a higher level 
to apply to a lower level.  In order to avoid cross-level inferences and the ecological 
fallacy, multi-level analysis was performed, with perceived risk as the dependent 
variable and the remaining variables as predictors4. For comparison with previous 
research (Garg & Camp, 2012), who tested their model of perceived risk with 
multiple-regression analysis, Online Supplementary Material OSM2 presents 
corresponding results of multiple-regression analysis.  The difference in the results 
with those of our multi-level analysis (presented below) clearly demonstrates the 
fallacy of cross-level inferences and the benefit of conducting non-aggregated 
analysis. 
In staged model testing (recommended by Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013), the difference 
between subsequent models was tested (Table 5).  A model with hazard-related 
Level-1 predictors (Model 2) explained more variance than the null model (without 
predictors) (Model 1).  Model 3 (Model 2 augmented with established subject-related 
Level-2 predictors) explained significantly more variance than Model 2.  Model 4 
(Model 3 augmented with interaction effects of hazard with the Level-1 predictors) 
explained significantly more variance than Model 3.  Model 5 (Model 4 augmented 
with exploratory Level-2 predictors) explained significantly more variance than Model 
3 and Model 4.  Therefore, Model 5 was retained as the final model.  The following 
results are those observed in this final model (Table 6).  Significant Level-2 (subject-
related) predictors of perceived risk were voluntariness (over all hazards), immediacy 
(over all hazards), catastrophic potential (over all hazards), dread (over all hazards), 
severity (over all hazards), length of Internet experience, and frequency of Internet 
logon.  Specifically, the results show that perceived risk was higher the longer 
Internet experience, the less frequent Internet use, the greater involuntariness (over 
all hazards), the greater immediacy/the less delay (over all hazards), the greater 
catastrophic potential (over all hazards), the less dread (over all hazards) and the 
greater perceived severity (over all hazards) were. 
Significant Level-1 (hazard-specific) predictors were voluntariness, control, 
catastrophic potential, severity, knowledge to science by hazard, dread by hazard 
                                            
4 The analysis did not include subject (participant) as a random effect.  This is because the finding of 
a significant random effect of subject is expected and not of interest. 
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and severity potential by hazard.  The greater involuntariness (hazard-specific), the 
greater lack of control (hazard-specific), the greater catastrophic potential (hazard-
specific) and the greater perceived severity (hazard-specific) were, the higher 
perceived risk was.   
Some further observations are worth noting here.  The contribution to predicting 
perceived risk by hazard-specific knowledge to population, dread and severity was 
moderated by, and therefore varied with, hazard.  Because of these three moderated 
effects, follow-up regression analyses per hazard were conducted (Online 
Supplementary Material OSM2).  Most consistent were the effects of severity of 
consequences, catastrophic potential, dread and benefit.  Furthermore, where the 
correlation between dread (over all hazards) and perceived risk was positive, the 
regression coefficient was negative.  This result may be interpreted as effect 
reversal, a type of suppressive recast mediation (Koeske & Koeske, 2006).  Results 
from additional analysis indicate that, together, the predictors severity (hazard-
specific and over all hazards) and catastrophic potential severity (hazard-specific 
and over all hazards) were responsible for the effect reversal; with both these 
predictors removed the regression co-efficient changed from negative (-.09) to 
positive (.03).  As in previous analyses (see Section 5.1), in our multi-level analysis 
hazards also differed in perceived risk, but here we show that this is the case even 
with length of Internet experience, frequency of Internet use and perceptions of other 
risk dimensions, both over all hazards and hazard-specific, held constant.  Moreover, 
the effect of risk dimension varied depending on level of aggregation (over all 
hazards or hazard-specific).  In particular, control was a positive predictor of 
perceived risk at the level of hazard, but not at the level of participant.  There was 
also evidence of a composition effect of voluntariness, catastrophic potential and 
severity5.  For example, perceived risk decreased as voluntariness for specific 
hazards increased; this was in addition to the decrease in perceived risk with an 
increase in voluntariness over all hazards. 
In relation to Research Question 4, we analysed the antecedents of precautionary 
behaviour against risk in cyber-security.  Precautionary behaviour was analysed for 
those behaviours for which risk perceptions of hazards were also measured.  These 
were using anti-virus software and using anti-spyware software.  Overall, the amount 
of variance that we were able to explain in computer security use was low (e.g., 
around 3 to 4% in the use of anti-spyware and anti-virus software respectively).  For 
the behaviour of using anti-virus software, control was a significant positive predictor 
(beta = 0.12, p < 0.05), so the more participants perceived themselves to be in 
control over the risk computer viruses posed, the more frequently they used anti-
virus software. 
                                            
5  A composition effect is the extent to which the relationship at a higher level adds to or differs from 
the relationship at a lower level (Heck, Thomas & Tabata, 2010). 
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5.3 Summary of results 
The analysis of hazards showed significant variation among security hazards in 
perceived risk, benefit and other risk dimensions (voluntariness, immediacy of effect, 
knowledge about risk by affected population, knowledge about risk by science, 
control over risk, newness, (chronic-)catastrophic potential, dread, and severity of 
consequences).  Students perceived identity theft as the riskiest hazard, and cookie 
and e-mail harvesting as the least risky.  The self-reported level of precautionary 
behaviour taken by students was relatively high and highest for using anti-virus 
software, and installing operating-system software updates and security software. 
Significant positive predictors of students’ risk perceptions were Internet experience, 
involuntariness, lack of control, immediacy of consequences, catastrophic potential 
and severity.  Significant negative predictors were frequency of Internet use and 
dread.  A significant positive predictor of the precautionary behaviour of using anti-
virus software was perceived control. 
6 General discussion 
The specific aim of this research is to study risk perceptions on the Internet, in 
particular in relation to security.  Our goals were to (1) determine how different 
security-related hazards on the Internet are perceived, (2) establish to the extent to 
which students take precautions against different potential security-related hazards, 
and (3) ascertain the antecedents of risk perception and precautionary behaviours.  
In this section, we review our results in relation to each of the three goals.  We also 
discuss the implications of our work, make recommendations, and discuss limitations 
of our work and ideas for future work. 
6.1 Risk perceptions and precautions for individual hazards 
 
Although previous research (Garg & Camp, 2012) analysed students’ risk 
perceptions of Internet hazards, differences among hazards were not statistically 
tested.  Our results are novel as we statistically test differences, not only in terms of 
perceived risk, but also on other risk dimensions.  In the next section, we discuss our 
results in relation to hazard-specific risk perception and precautionary behaviour. 
Risk perception.  The results for risk perception suggest that among our participants, 
perceptions of risk, dread and severity were highest for identity theft and keylogger 
on the Internet – the former finding in line with the results by Garg and Camp (2012).  
Both keyloggers and identity theft suggest immediate and personal consequences 
for users, which may therefore also have increased our respondents’ perceptions of 
risk.  In addition, press coverage about identity theft may have increased awareness 
by increasing availability, “the ease with which instances” of identity theft come to 
mind (Kahneman, 2011, p. 129).  Perceptions of risk and severity were also among 
the highest for cyber-bullying and social engineering.  This may be because both 
these hazards were described in terms of their adverse consequences (harming or 
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harassing a victim for cyber-bullying and releasing a victim’s valuable information for 
social engineering).  Both news reports in the media of cyber-bullying may lead to 
higher availability of episodes related to these risks.  In addition, students may be 
more aware of cyber-bullying due to their use of social media, thereby raising 
concerns (Finucane et al., 2000).  These circumstances may both increase the 
perceived risk of being targeted by a social-engineering attack as well.   
There was also significant variance in terms of the degree to which hazards did or 
did not raise risk perceptions.  For example, perceptions of risk were among the 
lowest for catfishing (a type of social engineering; see Appendix 1).  This may be 
because genuine potential adverse consequences for the individual are not 
immediately obvious and in contrast to cyber-bullying or identity theft, it is less likely 
for most students to come across the real-world equivalent in their daily interactions.   
Precautionary behaviour.  Our participants’ ratings of their precautionary behaviour 
in terms of computer security usage were relatively high but not correlated with 
demographics.  Furthermore, some computer security behaviours (e.g., relating to 
anti-virus software) were used more frequently than others (e.g., relating to anti-
spyware software), perhaps because the former are more familiar. This self-reported 
behaviour is only related to software hazards; in particular, virus and spyware were 
included in the scale items.  However, these tools may not be effective against 
identity-related and online social hazards.  Moreover, users may make trade-offs 
between security and convenience. Herley (2009), for example, argues that security 
behaviour may protect users against direct costs of potential security breaches, but 
at the same time burdens them with indirect costs in terms of effort.  This means 
adopting security measures is also associated with additional costs, reducing users’ 
intention to adopt and implement security measures (e.g., Lee, 2011; Liang & Xue, 
2010).   
6.2 Antecedents of perceived risk and precautionary behaviour 
Previous research tested the predictive power of risk dimensions for perceived risk in 
cyber-security (Huang et al., 2010; Garg & Camp, 2012, 2015).  However, this 
previous work used aggregated data analysis and therefore suffered from the 
ecological fallacy.  Moreover, there seems to be a lack of research testing a 
comprehensive set of risk perception predictors. 
Risk perception.  Antecedents of risk perception were differentiated in terms of those 
that were hazard-specific (Level-1) and subject-specific predictors (Level-2).  
Together, these were analysed using multi-level analysis (Heck et al., 2010).  
Perceived risk was positively predicted by immediacy (over all hazards), catastrophic 
potential (over all hazards) and perceived severity (over all hazards), catastrophic 
potential (hazard-specific) and perceived severity (hazard-specific), as well as 
Internet experience.  These findings lead us to conclude the following.  First, the 
greater the perceived immediacy of security hazards overall, the higher the 
perceived risk of cyber-security hazards.  This is consistent with previous work that 
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indicates that when negative consequences are likely to be delayed, perceived risk is 
reduced (Kahneman, 2011).   
Second, perceived risk was higher with greater perceived catastrophic potential of 
hazards overall and of individual hazards.  This finding is consistent with the idea 
that hazards with a larger impact on a single occasion are perceived as more risky 
(Adams, 2012) and with research findings showing that this applies to a range of 
hazards in the domain of terrorism (Mumpower et al., 2013).  Third, the greater the 
severity of consequences of hazards overall and of individual hazards was, the 
higher the perceived risk.  Previous research has also demonstrated that risks that 
are perceived to have more severe consequences are perceived to be riskier.  For 
example, perceptions of the severity of a security breach through hacking predicted 
perceived risk of online shopping (Chakraborty et al., 2016).  Fourth, Internet 
experience was a significant positive predictor of perceived risk.  This finding is 
consistent with previous research that has demonstrated that personal experience 
positively predicts perceived risk (Van der Linden, 2014; Lujala, Lein & Rød, 2015). 
A number of variables operated as negative predictors of risk perceptions.  These 
were voluntariness (over all hazards), voluntariness (hazard-specific) and control 
(hazard-specific), as well as frequency of Internet use.  The prediction of risk 
perception by (hazard-specific) knowledge by population, dread and severity, was 
moderated by hazard.  These results also indicate, first, that the less voluntary an 
Internet user perceives exposure to security hazards overall and to individual 
hazards, the riskier they perceive specific hazards to be.  These findings provide 
support for the idea that the more voluntary risks are perceived to be, the less risky 
they are perceived to be (Starr, 1969).  This can lead to optimism bias 
(underestimation) regarding security risk (Rhee et al., 2012) and consequently less 
safe online behaviour on the network (Huang et al., 2011).  Second, when people 
feel more in control, their perception of risk is reduced (see also Rhee et al., 2012).  
Our results support this idea, as perceived control over individual hazards was a 
significant negative predictor of perceived risk.  Third, students who more frequently 
used the Internet (more than three times a day) perceived cyber-security hazards as 
less risky.  This may be because students who are more frequent Internet users are 
also more prone to impulsivity and sensation-seeking, which have been linked to 
reduced risk perception (Hosker-Field, Molnar & Book, 2016). 
Precautionary behaviour.  Our analyses revealed that the predictive power of our 
antecedents of precautionary behaviour was considerably less (they only explained 3 
to 4% of the variance compared to more than 40% of variance in terms of risk 
perception).  This may be due to a number of reasons.  First, measurements of 
precautionary behaviour were available for only two hazards, while risk perception 
was measured for 16 hazards.  Second, a comprehensive multi-level analysis with 
each hazard measured in terms of risk dimensions and precautionary behaviour was 
not an option here.  Our results show that control was a significant positive predictor 
of computer security use, in terms of using add-on anti-virus software.  Therefore, 
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and consistent with previous research (e.g., Anderson & Agarwal, 2010), students 
who felt more in control of their computer security used anti-virus software more 
frequently. 
6.3 Methodological implications 
The specific aim of this research is to study university students’ risk perceptions and 
precautionary behaviour in Internet use, in relation to security.  As part of this 
research, we expand on and contribute to the existing theory and research in a 
number of ways.  First, and at a more general level, we introduced readers to 
different approaches that may be used in the study of risk and outline the pros and 
cons of these in terms of their merit or use to inform empirical research.  We expand 
on existing work on risk perception by studying a broad range of both technical and 
social hazards.  The research design is inspired by and builds on the previous 
studies conducted in China and the USA with students (Huang, 2011; Garg & Camp, 
2012, 2015), older adults (Garg, Lorenzen-Huber, Camp & Connelly, 2012) and 
others (Huang et al., 2010) as participants, but is novel in the following respects. 
In terms of the theoretical as well as methodological level, we use a multi-level 
analysis and provide an example of how the expressed risk-related preference 
approach (see Slovic, 1987) may support a more refined analysis of risk perceptions.  
We essentially demonstrate the benefit of psychometric methods.  Our study thus 
provides insight that may contribute to the improvements in research design and 
data analysis, most notably through multi-level analysis on non-aggregated data.  
This is important because existing research that has developed prediction equations 
of perceived risk has usually averaged data over hazards (Fischhoff et al., 1978), 
thereby potentially suffering from the fallacy of cross-level inferences (Pedhazur, 
1997) and the ecological fallacy (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013).  At a methodological 
level alone, we analysed both risk perception and precautionary behaviour 
separately and in relation to each other, rather than only risk perception (Slovic, 
Kraus, Lappe, Letzel & Malmfors, 1989).  Our approach to studying risk perception 
and precautionary behaviour can be summarised as follows.  We compared the 
results of our non-aggregated linear multi-level analysis (Section 5.2) with those of 
aggregated multiple-regression analyses (Online Supplementary Material OSM2).  
We found that the latter analysis failed to identify immediacy and control as 
significant predictors of perceived risk (although these predictors were significant in 
the former analysis) and incorrectly identified benefit as a significant predictor.  
These results empirically demonstrate the loss of information (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2013) that aggregated analysis entails.  As a comparison, Garg and Camp’s (2012) 
regression analysis of perceived risk was conducted at the aggregate level and 
therefore could not identify the moderation of predictors by hazard, as in our study. 
The implication of the results of multi-level analysis is that in statistical inference non-
aggregated data should be analysed to avoid fallacies of inference and a loss of 
information that are associated with the analysis of aggregated data.  In particular, in 
prediction equations, multi-level analysis needs to include two levels: hazard (Level 
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1) and subject (over hazards, Level 2).  Level 1 predictors are those that have been 
measured per hazard (e.g., perceived control to avoid potential harm from a 
particular hazard).  Level 2 predictors are those that have not been measured per 
hazard (e.g., length of Internet experience) and aggregates of Level 1 predictors 
(e.g., perceived control to avoid potential harm from the combined set of hazards 
that is presented).  The analysis of the predictive power of these Level 2 aggregates 
and their Level 1 counterparts allows us to assess which predictors are significant at 
each level, and whether a compositional effect exists (Heck et al., 2010). 
6.4 Practical implications and recommendations  
Organisations have several options available to them to teach students and other 
computer users about risks and educate them about the merit of precautionary 
behaviours.  Education-based interventions (Caputo, Pfleeger, Freeman & Johnson, 
2014) will typically involve developing knowledge and skills of learners, with potential 
‘refresher’ education from time to time; the aim is that the application of knowledge 
and skills ‘transfers’ to the real-world, so that computer users are more likely to 
engage in safe behaviour.  Marketing-linked interventions (Reid & Van Niekerk, 
2016) will typically employ one-off awareness campaigns or continual campaigns 
presenting persuasive messages, with changing content and/or delivery to keep the 
audience’s attention; the aim is that computer users’ raised awareness will make 
them act safely in the real world.  Some interventions may focus on the use of 
specific design features (e.g., Coventry, Briggs, Jeske & Van Moorsel, 2014) such as 
human-computer interaction ‘nudges’ to improve people’s precautionary decisions.  
The advantage of these types of intervention is that nudges direct people’s choices, 
without coercion, towards safer behaviour by helping them to engage in 
precautionary decision-making behaviour that is also less effortful (or by making less 
safe behaviour more effortful).  Based on our prediction results regarding 
precautionary behaviour (discussed in Section 6.2), education and marketing 
interventions should consider emphasising computer users’ control in relation to 
software hazards. 
We can identify a number of practical recommendations, many of which build on 
existing recommendations to raise their information security awareness (see also 
Ahmad & Maynard, 2014; Kim, 2014).  Based on our results regarding the variability 
of risk perception and precautionary behaviour among hazards, universities’ 
education and marketing interventions should consider the following.  First, although 
some security-related hazards (e.g., catfishing) are perceived by students as less 
risky than others, they do pose potential danger.  Consequently, students – and 
future new hires – may be particularly vulnerable to security breaches emanating 
from a lack of awareness of these hazards.  Therefore, if the aim is to raise risk 
perception for specific hazards among students then target hazards that can have 
substantial negative consequences for students, but that are perceived as less risky 
(technical hazards such as trojans and online social hazards such as catfishing).  
Second, if the aim is to increase precautionary behaviour among students then 
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target technical hazards of using add-on firewall software and anti-spyware software 
(relative to other technical hazards). 
Based on our results on the prediction of risk perception and precautionary  
behaviour, universities’ education- and marketing interventions should consider the 
following.  First, if the aim is to raise risk perception then (1) target students who 
have less experience with using the Internet and students who use the Internet more 
frequently; and (2) emphasise to students the knowledge to population, dread and 
severity associated with particular hazards6.  More generally, interventions should 
ideally be considering the baseline knowledge of individuals about hazards to tackle 
gaps in risk knowledge strategically.  Second, if the aim is to increase precautionary 
behaviour then emphasise students’ control in relation to software hazards. 
We illustrate potential specific interventions with the hazard of catfishing.  In an 
education intervention (Caputo et al., 2014), students (or members of other target 
populations) may develop knowledge about the nature of catfishing in terms of its 
defining features and skills in detecting catfishing through realistic exercises.  In a 
marketing intervention (Reid & Van Niekerk, 2016), members of the target population 
(e.g., university students) may receive persuasive messages, warning of the 
potential negative consequences of falling victim to and/or the benefits of avoiding 
catfishing.  After all, when risks are underestimated it can encourage people to 
demonstrate unsafe behaviour (Huang et al., 2011).  In a design intervention 
(Coventry et al., 2014), the e-mail client program may be enhanced with an 
automated catfishing detector that analyses individual messages sent to a student-
user, and e-mail threads between the user and the perpetrator; when the program 
detects a potential instance of catfishing, the user is notified and urged not to 
(further) respond. 
6.5 Limitations and future research 
This study has some methodological and substance-related limitations.  In terms of 
method, for example, a limitation of the current study is its cross-sectional design.  
Longitudinal research may be better suited to testing and assessing the stability of 
risk perceptions.  Additionally, this paper deals with conduct-related risk.  People’s 
behaviour often changes when they become more familiar with risks.  In other words, 
a potential difficulty of studying such risk is that perceptions change once risks are 
identified as such (see also Garland, 2003).  Hence, risk is reactive, meaning that 
respondents’ perceptions might be influenced by filling out a risk questionnaire.   
In addition, our sample consisted of (mainly social-science) students, so the results 
may not generalise to other populations; however, students are an important group 
to study in their own right in relation to cyber-security (see Section 3).  Furthermore, 
                                            
6  phishing, cookie for knowledge to population; and phishing, identity theft, Internet surveillance, 
cookie, trojans, botnet, e-mail harvesting, virtual stalking, cyber-bullying and social engineering for 
dread. 
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we did not rely on participants’ risk perception only, but also measured computer 
security behaviours with the CSU measure (Claar & Johnson, 2012).   
We also ought to acknowledge that the antecedents we reviewed above are unlikely 
to be a ‘complete list’.  Rather, we set out to determine how useful predictors are that 
appear in the risk perception literature using psychometric methods, but now in the 
context of security in online social networks.  Furthermore, future work may use a 
more comprehensive measurement of security measurement (Egelman & Peer, 
2015; Egelman, Harbach & Peer, 2016) that includes a precautionary behaviour for 
each hazard7. In addition, the focus of our paper was on threat appraisal, rather than 
coping appraisal.  Future research may build on the detailed insights regarding 
perceived threat appraisal from our study by exploring both threat appraisal and 
coping appraisal together and how they influence behaviour. 
In terms of substance, in our results, the effect of control on perceived risk differed 
from its effect on precautionary behaviour.  This can be understood as follows.  On 
the one hand, recent studies have demonstrated the positive effect on precautionary 
behaviour of personal responsibility to take control of one’s own security (Anderson 
& Agarwal, 2010; Boehmer, LaRose, Rifon, Alhabash & Cotten, 2015; Shillair, 
Cotten, Tsai, Alhabash, Larose & Rifon, 2015; Jansen & Van Schaik, 2016; Jansen, 
Veenstra, Zuurveen & Stol, 2016).  On the other hand, more control results in a 
reduction in perceived risk (Rhee et al., 2012), which (in turn) leads to less 
precautionary behaviour.  Future longitudinal research may be able to give a better 
insight into how different antecedents interact, inhibit or enable each other. 
A focus on and blame of ‘the human factor’ as the ‘weakest link’ to explain security 
breaches ignores the limitation of other layers of the security control system (e.g., 
anti-virus software, host intrusion protection system, network protection and firewall) 
(Garg, 2016).  In Garg’s argument, if security is breached because of human error, a 
host of other controls have failed as well; for example, anti-virus software might only 
block 70% of computer viruses, but anti-virus is still considered useful and is 
purchased.  Therefore, why do we expect human computer users to make correct 
cyber-security decisions 100% of the time, but not expect technical controls (e.g., 
security software) to work correctly 100% of the time?  “If anything, technical controls 
should perform better” (Garg, 2016).  Interdisciplinary future research may therefore 
examine the security control system as a whole.  A comprehensive analysis may 
identify alternative security plans from which to choose to achieve a target level of 
security that is deemed acceptable. 
7 Conclusion 
Using psychometric methods in a quantitative empirical online study, we analysed 
students’ security-related risk perceptions and precautionary behaviour in their use 
                                            
7 Egelman and Peer’s (2015) inventory was not available at the time the current study was 
designed. 
22/50 
 
of the Internet.  The main contributions of our work lie in demonstrating variation 
between hazards in people’s risk perceptions related to cyber-security; and 
identifying predictors of perceived security-related risks and precautionary behaviour 
online in relation to existing research in risk perception and cyber-security.  The main 
implications are the empirical demonstration that non-aggregated data analysis can 
help avoid methodological fallacies and derived recommendations for behavioural 
interventions with regard to cyber-security.  We encourage future research to build 
on our insights, as part of a larger effort to better understand the determinants of 
people’s propensity to protect themselves from potential cyber-security hazards. 
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Table 1     
Hazards and comparison activities     
Activity/artefact 
Current 
study 
Garg and Camp 
(2012) 
Type Category 
Identity theft on the Internet   Hazard Identity-related 
Phishing   Hazard Identity-related 
Internet surveillance   Hazard Monitoring 
Virtual stalking   Hazard Online social 
Cyber-bullying   Hazard Online social 
Social engineering   Hazard Online social 
Catfishing   Hazard Online social 
Virus   Hazard Software 
Spyware   Hazard Software 
Trojan   Hazard Software 
Worms   Hazard Software 
Keylogger   Hazard Software 
Malware   Hazard Software 
Spam   Hazard Software 
Botnet   Hazard Software 
Zombies   Hazard Software 
Cookie   Hazard Software 
Spoofing   Hazard Software 
Rogueware   Hazard Software 
Zero-day attack   Hazard Software 
E-mail-harvesting   Hazard Software 
Browsing Internet sites for information   Comparison NA 
Information-sharing on social media    Comparison NA 
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Table 2
Means for risk
Mean
Hazard/comparison Lower Upper 
Identity theft on the Internet 5.94 5.83 6.06
Keylogger 5.73 5.61 5.85
Cyber-bullying 5.67 5.54 5.79
Social engineering 5.63 5.50 5.75
Virus 5.54 5.41 5.66
Phishing 5.51 5.38 5.63
Virtual stalking 5.50 5.37 5.63
Botnet 5.45 5.32 5.57
Spyware 5.44 5.29 5.58
Rogueware 5.41 5.28 5.54
Trojan 5.40 5.27 5.53
Zero-day attack 5.27 5.14 5.41
Catfishing 4.98 4.84 5.12
Information-sharing on social media 4.61 4.48 4.76
Internet surveillance 4.38 4.22 4.54
E-mail-harvesting 4.21 4.04 4.38
Cookie 3.39 3.24 3.54
Browsing Internet sites for information 2.87 2.74 3.02
Note . Responses on a 7-point semantic-differential.
Table 3
Means for  risk balance
Mean
Hazard/comparison Lower Upper 
Browsing Internet sites for information 2.79 2.55 3.03
Cookie 0.74 0.52 0.96
Internet surveillance 0.00 -0.26 0.26
Information-sharing on social media -0.65 -0.88 -0.44
E-mail-harvesting -1.73 -1.96 -1.51
Zero-day attack -2.51 -2.75 -2.24
Spyware -2.66 -2.91 -2.42
Catfishing -2.72 -2.94 -2.52
Trojan -2.95 -3.17 -2.72
Botnet -3.04 -3.25 -2.81
Rogueware -3.17 -3.38 -2.97
Keylogger -3.28 -3.50 -3.07
Virtual stalking -3.30 -3.50 -3.07
Virus -3.33 -3.56 -3.09
Phishing -3.35 -3.57 -3.12
Social engineering -3.42 -3.64 -3.21
Identity theft on the Internet -3.69 -3.90 -3.48
Cyber-bullying -3.69 -3.90 -3.48
Note . Responses on a 7-point semantic-differential.
CI.95
CI.95
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Table 4
Mean ratings of perceived risk and other risk dimensions
Hazard/comparison Risk Benefit Volunta-
riness
Imme-
diacy
Knowledge 
(population)
Knowledge 
(science)
Control Newness Catastrophic 
potential
Dread Severity
Identity theft on the Internet 5.94 2.25 5.29 3.58 3.86 2.95 3.76 4.46 4.14 5.22 5.72
Keylogger 5.73 2.45 5.54 3.96 4.97 3.47 3.00 3.30 4.34 5.20 5.60
Cyber-bullying 5.67 1.98 5.22 3.17 3.29 2.88 3.71 4.22 3.30 4.85 5.45
Social engineering 5.63 2.22 4.57 3.69 4.56 3.31 4.33 4.01 4.12 4.98 5.60
Virus 5.54 2.22 5.16 3.36 3.98 2.96 3.92 5.11 4.66 4.47 5.31
Phishing 5.51 2.16 4.69 3.89 4.30 3.02 4.57 4.54 4.42 4.48 5.44
Virtual stalking 5.50 2.20 5.31 4.03 4.13 3.36 3.49 4.03 2.88 4.99 5.19
Botnet 5.45 2.41 5.54 3.65 5.28 3.67 3.23 3.53 5.26 4.78 5.14
Spyware 5.44 2.78 5.15 3.90 4.38 3.02 3.68 4.24 4.46 4.68 5.20
Rogueware 5.41 2.24 5.17 3.10 4.70 3.47 3.53 3.62 4.26 5.01 5.25
Trojan 5.40 2.45 5.44 3.65 4.62 3.24 3.63 4.33 4.36 4.76 5.29
Zero-day attack 5.27 2.76 5.51 3.20 5.19 4.28 2.98 2.99 5.14 4.90 5.09
Catfishing 4.98 2.26 3.95 4.78 4.18 3.41 4.43 3.50 2.89 4.20 4.97
Information-sharing on social media 4.61 3.96 2.33 4.01 3.14 2.74 5.66 4.02 3.62 2.91 4.34
Internet surveillance 4.38 4.38 5.61 4.53 4.87 3.01 3.03 3.82 4.74 4.14 4.34
E-mail-harvesting 4.21 2.48 5.44 3.80 4.10 3.14 3.64 4.63 5.12 3.34 3.95
Cookie 3.39 4.13 3.87 4.06 3.87 2.78 4.61 4.41 3.63 2.76 3.34
Browsing Internet sites for information 2.87 5.67 2.46 3.42 3.22 2.66 5.58 5.04 3.42 2.38 2.90  
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Table 5
Model testing, dependent variable perceived risk
df -2LL r  (pv, risk)
Model difference chi square df p Dr  (pv, risk)
1 Null model 2 26158.15 0.00 M1 - M2 3918.62 25 0.000 0.66
2 Level-1 predictors
a
27 22239.53 0.66 M1 - M3 4038.62 35 0.000 0.67
3 Level-1 predictors; established Level-2 predictors
b
37 22119.53 0.66 M1 - M4 4374.52 185 0.000 0.66
4 Level-1 predictors; established Level-2 predictors
b
; interactions with hazard 187 21855.72 0.68 M1 - M5 4374.52 187 0.000 0.68
5 Level-1 predictors; established Level-2 predictors
b
; interactions with hazard; exploratory Level-2 predictors
c
189 21783.63 0.68 M2 - M3 120.00 10 0.000 0.01
M3 - M4 263.81 150 0.000 0.02
M4 - M5 72.09 2 0.000 <0.01
c
length of Internet experience; frequency of Internet logon
Model Test of model difference
Note . pv: predicted value. Null model: intercept only. Level 1: hazard. Level 2: subject (participant).  
a
hazard, benefit, voluntariness, immediacy, knowledge by population, knowledge by science, control, newness, catastrophic potential, dread, and severity
b
averaged over hazards, benefit, voluntariness, immediacy, knowledge by population, knowledge by science, control, newness, catastrophic potential, dread, and severity
 
33/50 
 
Table 6
Parameter estimates and tests of effects, dependent variable perceived risk
Parameter b df df2 F p
LL UL
Intercept 1 6960 4108.81 .000
Length of Internet experience 0.01 0.00 0.02 1 6960 8.29 .004
Frequency of Internet logon -0.06 -0.12 -0.01 1 6960 4.85 .028
Benefit (subject) -0.01 -0.06 0.03 1 6960 0.53 .468
Voluntariness (subject) 0.09 0.04 0.13 1 6960 14.58 .000
Immediacy (subject) -0.04 -0.09 0.00 1 6960 3.96 .047
Knowledge to population (subject) -0.01 -0.06 0.03 1 6960 0.26 .613
Knowledge to science (subject) 0.02 -0.02 0.06 1 6960 0.67 .412
Control (subject) -0.01 -0.06 0.03 1 6960 0.43 .510
Newness (subject) 0.00 -0.04 0.03 1 6960 0.08 .783
Catastrophic potential (subject) 0.05 0.01 0.09 1 6960 5.26 .022
Dread (subject) -0.09 -0.13 -0.05 1 6960 16.72 .000
Severity (subject) 0.26 0.21 0.32 1 6960 81.60 .000
Hazard 15 6960 8.68 .000
Benefit (hazard) 0.02 -0.06 0.09 1 6960 0.17 .676
Voluntariness (hazard) 0.08 0.01 0.14 1 6960 5.66 .017
Immediacy (hazard) 0.06 -0.01 0.12 1 6960 3.23 .073
Knowledge to population (hazard) -0.03 -0.09 0.04 1 6960 0.70 .403
Knowledge to science (hazard) -0.02 -0.09 0.05 1 6960 0.32 .571
Control (hazard) 0.08 0.01 0.14 1 6960 5.35 .021
Newness (hazard) 0.02 -0.04 0.08 1 6960 0.30 .586
Catastrophic potential (hazard) 0.11 0.05 0.17 1 6960 12.28 .000
Dread (hazard) 0.06 -0.01 0.12 1 6960 2.69 .101
Severity (hazard) 0.42 0.34 0.51 1 6960 95.59 .000
Benefit (hazard) by hazard 15 6960 1.65 .053
Voluntariness (hazard) by hazard 15 6960 0.99 .463
Immediacy (hazard) by hazard 15 6960 1.08 .367
Knowledge to population (hazard) by hazard 15 6960 0.94 .524
Knowledge to science (hazard) by hazard 15 6960 2.05 .009
Control (hazard) by hazard 15 6960 0.71 .778
Newness (hazard) by hazard 15 6960 1.03 .416
Catastrophic potential (hazard) by hazard 15 6960 1.18 .278
Dread (hazard) by hazard 15 6960 1.68 .047
Severity (hazard) by hazard 15 6960 3.51 .000
CI 95%
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Figure 1 . Mean perceived risk as a function of hazard and nation.
1
2
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4
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UK US
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Appendix 1 – cyber-security hazards defined (see Jeske & Van Schaik, 2017) 
 Identity-related hazards 
1 Phishing The act of sending an e-mail to a user falsely claiming 
to be an established legitimate enterprise.  The aim is 
to scam the user into surrendering private information 
that will be used to steal the user’s identity. 
2 Identity theft on the 
Internet  
Any kind of fraud on the Internet that results in the 
loss of personal data, such as passwords, user 
names, banking information, or credit card numbers 
 Monitoring 
3 Internet surveillance The monitoring of online behaviour, activities or other 
changing information, often in secret and without 
authorization.  This is usually carried out on 
individuals or groups observed by governmental 
organizations. 
 Software hazards 
4 Virus Harmful computer program or script that attempts to 
spread from one file to another on a single computer 
and/or from one computer to another, using a variety 
of methods, without the knowledge and consent of the 
computer user. 
5 Cookie  A small piece of text or file that is stored in a user’s 
computer.  Contains information that identifies the 
user to a particular Web site, and any information 
about the user during their visit to the site. 
6 Spyware A program that runs on a user’s computer and tracks 
their browsing habits or captures information such as 
email messages, usernames, passwords, and credit 
card information. 
7 Keylogger A computer program that records every keystroke 
made by a computer user to gain fraudulent access to 
passwords and other confidential information. 
8 Trojan Tracking software that attempts to infiltrate a 
computer without the user’s knowledge or consent.  
This software often presents itself as one form while it 
is actually another. 
9 Botnet A collection of private computers that have been set 
up to forward transmissions (including spam or 
viruses) to other computers on the Internet, even 
though the computers’ owners are unaware of this. 
10 Rogueware Malicious software that restricts access to the 
computer system that it infects.  Either demands a 
ransom to lift the restriction or frightens people into 
purchasing and installing additional malicious 
software by alerting a user to a false problem.   
11 Zero-day attack An attack that exploits previously unknown software 
vulnerabilities before security researchers and 
software developers become aware of them to create 
a fix or patch. 
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12 E-mail-harvesting The process of obtaining a large list of email 
addresses though various means for purposes such 
as bulk spamming without the authority or the 
persons involved. 
 Online social hazards 
13 Virtual stalking  Use of the Internet, e-mail or other electronic 
communication devices to stalk or repeatedly follow 
and harass another person. 
14 Cyber-bullying The use of information technology, in particular 
through the Internet, to harm or harass other people 
in a deliberate, repeated, and hostile manner 
 
15 Social engineering The art of manipulating individuals to divulge 
confidential information.  Criminals usually try to trick 
their victims into breaking normal security procedures 
and releasing valuable information such as 
passwords and bank details. 
16 Catfishing The act of building a fake relationship online by 
pretending to be someone else, creating an online 
romance through a false persona or fake social media 
profile. 
 Comparison activities 
17 Browsing Internet 
sites for information 
Visiting Internet sites to gain information on topics 
chosen by the user. 
18 Information sharing 
on social media 
Making personal information available to other users 
of social media. 
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Online Supplementary Material OSM1 – study-questionnaire items 
Demographics 
D1 Demographic Information 
How old are you (years)? 
D2 Demographic Information 
What is your gender?  (Please select one answer.) 
o Female 
o Male 
D3 Demographic Information 
What is your highest level of education?  (Please select one answer.) 
o Primary school (1) 
o High school diploma or equivalent (2) 
o Associate degree (community college) (3) 
o Degree (for example BA or BS) (4) 
o Higher degree (for example MA, MS or PhD) (5) 
o Other (9) 
D4 Demographic Information 
What is your situation in relation to work? (Please select one answer.) 
o Employed (1) 
o Unemployed/looking for work (2) 
o No response/rather not say (3) 
o Other (4) 
D5 Internet Use 
How long have you been using the Internet (years)? 
D6 Internet Use 
How often do you log on to the Internet? (Please select one answer.)  
o Weekly 
o 2-3 times a week 
o 4-6 times a week 
o Daily 
o 2-3 times a day 
o More than 3 times a day 
38/50 
 
D7 Internet Use 
Once on line, how much time do you spend on the Internet on average? (Please 
select one answer.) 
o 1-5 minutes 
o 6-10 minutes 
o About 15 minutes 
o About 30 minutes 
o About 45 minutes 
o About 1 hour 
o Several hours 
D8 Internet Use 
What do you use the Internet for? (Select all that apply.) 
 E-mail 
 Reading news 
 Visiting chat rooms, forums 
 Managing bank accounts 
 Searching for work-related or study-related information 
 Education/training 
 Surfing (exploring the Web) 
 Downloading or file sharing (for example, BitTorrent) 
 Working 
 Buying products or services (for example, general shopping, train tickets, books, 
insurance and travel) 
 Social networking (for example, Facebook and YouTube) 
 Other 
 
Perceived risk 
Each question consists of a title, a stem, a hazard (16, each related a specific 
security- or privacy setting in Facebook) or an activity (2: browsing Internet sites for 
information and cyber-bullying), and a response.  The questions only differ in 
hazard/comparison; therefore, stem and response are not repeated. 
Question 1 
[title] 
Risk 
[stem] 
Consider the risk of harm as a consequence of the following 
activity/technology/aspect.  For example, the use of electricity carries the risk of 
electrocution.  It also entails risk for miners who produce the coal that generates the 
electricity.  For another example, motor vehicles entail risk for drivers, passengers, 
bicyclists and pedestrians.  To what extent does the following 
activity/technology/aspect pose a risk to the population?
39/50 
 
[comparison] 
Information-sharing on social media 
Making personal information available to other users of social media 
[response] 
poses no 
risk 
     poses 
great risk 
       
PR2 
Question 2 
[comparison] 
Browsing Internet sites for information 
Visiting Internet sites to gain information on topics chosen by the user 
Question 3 
[hazard] 
Phishing 
The act of sending an e-mail to a user falsely claiming to be an established 
legitimate enterprise. The aim is to scam the user into surrendering private 
information that will be used to steal the user’s identity. 
Question 4 
[hazard] 
Identity theft on the Internet 
Any kind of fraud on the Internet that results in the loss of personal data, such as 
passwords, user names, banking information, or credit card numbers 
Question 5 
[hazard] 
Internet surveillance 
The monitoring of online behaviour, activities or other changing information, often in 
secret and without authorisation. This is usually carried out on individuals or groups 
observed by governmental organisations 
Question 6 
[hazard] 
Virus 
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Harmful computer program or script that attempts to spread from one file to another 
on a single computer and/or from one computer to another, using a variety of 
methods, without the knowledge and consent of the computer user 
Question 7 
[hazard] 
Cookie 
A small piece of text or file that is stored in a user’s computer. Contains information 
that identifies the user to a particular Web site, and any information about the user 
during their visit to the site 
Question 8 
[hazard] 
Spyware 
A program that runs on a user’s computer and tracks their browsing habits or 
captures information such as email messages, usernames, passwords, and credit 
card information 
Question 9 
[hazard] 
Keylogger 
A computer program that records every keystroke made by a computer user to gain 
fraudulent access to passwords and other confidential information 
Question 10 
[hazard] 
Trojan 
Tracking software that attempts to infiltrate a computer without the user’s knowledge 
or consent. This software often presents itself as one form while it is actually another 
Question 11 
[hazard] 
Botnet 
A collection of private computers that have been set up to forward transmissions 
(including spam or viruses) to other computers on the Internet, even though the 
computers' owners are unaware of this 
Question 12 
[hazard] 
41/50 
 
Rogueware 
Malicious software that restricts access to the computer system that it infects. Either 
demands a ransom to lift the restriction or frightens people into purchasing and 
installing additional malicious software by alerting a user to a false problem 
Question 13 
[hazard] 
Zero-day attack 
An attack that exploits previously unknown software vulnerabilities before security 
researchers and software developers become aware of them to create a fix or patch 
Question 14 
[hazard] 
E-mail-harvesting 
The process of obtaining a large list of email addresses though various means for 
purposes such as bulk spamming without the authority or the persons involved 
Question 15 
[hazard] 
Virtual stalking 
Use of the Internet, e-mail or other electronic communication devices to stalk or 
repeatedly follow and harass another person 
Question 16 
[hazard] 
Cyber-bullying 
The use of information technology, in particular through the Internet, to harm or 
harass other people in a deliberate, repeated, and hostile manner 
Question 17 
[hazard] 
Social engineering 
The art of manipulating individuals to divulge confidential information. Criminals 
usually try to trick their victims into breaking normal security procedures and 
releasing valuable information such as passwords and bank details 
Question 18 
[hazard] 
Cat-fishing 
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The act of building a fake relationship online by pretending to be someone else, 
creating an online romance through a false persona or fake social media profile 
Benefit 
Hazards and comparisons remain as under Perceived risk. 
[stem] 
Your job is to assess the *gross benefits*, not the net benefits after the costs and 
risks are subtracted out. Remember that a beneficial activity affecting few people will 
have less gross benefit than a beneficial activity affecting many people. If you need 
to think of a time period during which the benefits accrue, think of a whole year – the 
total value to society from each item during one year. How do you think the following 
activity/technology/aspect provides benefits to the population? 
[response] 
no benefit      great 
benefit 
       
B2 
Voluntariness 
Hazards and comparisons remain as under Perceived risk. 
[stem] 
To what extent is the population voluntarily exposed to the risks associated with the 
following activity/technology/aspect? 
[response] 
voluntary      involun-
tary 
       
 
Immediacy of effect 
Hazards and comparisons remain as under Perceived risk. 
[stem] 
Are the effects of the risks associated with the following activity/technology/aspect 
immediate or do they occur later on? 
[response] 
immediate      delayed 
       
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Knowledge about risk by affected population 
Hazards and comparisons remain as under Perceived risk. 
[stem] 
To which extent are the risks associated with the following activity/technology/aspect 
known precisely known to those who are exposed those risks? 
[response] 
known 
precisely 
     not 
known 
       
 
Knowledge about risk by science 
Hazards and comparisons remain as under Perceived risk. 
[stem] 
To which extent are the risks associated with the following activity/technology/aspect 
known precisely known to science/experts? 
[response] 
known 
precisely 
     not 
known 
       
 
Control over risk 
Hazards and comparisons remain as under Perceived risk. 
[stem] 
If people are exposed to the risks associated with the following 
activity/technology/aspect, to what extent can they, by personal skill or diligence, 
avoid harm? 
[response] 
un-
controllable 
     completely 
controllable 
       
 
Newness 
Hazards and comparisons remain as under Perceived risk. 
[stem] 
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Are the risks associated with the following activity/technology/aspect new and 
unfamiliar or old and familiar?  
[response] 
new      old 
       
 
Chronic-catastrophic (effect) 
Hazards and comparisons remain as under Perceived risk. 
[stem] 
Do the risks associated with the following activity/technology/aspect harm people 
one at a time (chronic risk) or do they harm large numbers of people at once 
(catastrophic risk)? 
[response] 
chronic      catastrophic 
       
 
Dread 
Hazards and comparisons remain as under Perceived risk. 
[stem] 
Have people learned to live with and can they think calmly about the risks associated 
with the following activity/technology/aspect or are do people have great dread for 
these risks – on the level of a gut reaction?  
[response] 
common      dread 
       
 
Severity of consequences 
Hazards and comparisons remain as under Perceived risk. 
[stem] 
When the risks of the following activity/technology/aspect are realised in the form of 
a mishap, how likely is it that the consequences will be disastrous? 
[response] 
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Certain 
not to be 
disastrous 
     Certain not 
to be 
disastrous 
       
 
Attitudes-towards-using-the-Internet scale 
All things considered, my use of the Internet is 
Good (1) – Bad (7) 
Beneficial (1) – Harmful (7) 
Positive (1) – Negative (7) 
Wise (1) – Foolish (7) 
Favorable (1) – Unfavorable (7) 
Computer-security-usage scale (Claar & Johnson, 2012) 
I use add-on anti-virus software on my main home computer 
I use add-on firewall software on my main home computer 
I use add-on anti-spyware software on my main home computer 
I install software updates of the operating system on my main home computer 
I install security-software updates of security software (anti-virus software, firewall 
software and/or anti-spyware software) on my main home computer 
Scale end-points: never (1) and always (7) 
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Online Supplementary Material OSM2 – regression analysis of 
perceived risk 
Multiple-regression analysis aggregated over hazards (as in previous research; Garg 
et al., 2012) was conducted with perceived risk as dependent variable and 
perceptions of benefits and nine other risk-related attributes (voluntariness, 
immediacy of effect, knowledge about risk by affected population, knowledge about 
risk by science, control over risk, newness, [chronic-]catastrophic potential, dread, 
and severity of consequences), attitude towards using the Internet, and length of 
Internet experience as predictors.  The regression model explained 54% of variance 
in perceived risk, R2 = .54, F (12, 422) = 41.49, p < .001.  Significant predictors were 
benefit, beta = -0.09, t (422) = -2.20, p < .05, voluntariness, beta = 0.13, t (422) = 
3.35, p < .001, catastrophic potential, beta = 0.13, t (422) = 3.35, p < .001, and 
severity, beta = 0.59, t (422) = 14.62, p < .001.  By definition, the results presented 
here suffer from the ecological fallacy.  Therefore and from a comparison with the 
results of multilevel analysis (see Section 3.2) that show less variance explained in 
perceived risk, we conclude that the results presented here overestimate the 
explanatory power of the predictors and erroneously identify some specific predictors 
as significant and others as non-significant, with variance explained ranging from 
22% (R2 = .22 for cyber-bullying) to 49% (R2 = .49 for cookie). 
Table OSM2 presents the results of regression analysis of perceived risk by hazard 
(referenced in the main text).
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Table OSM1
Multiple-regression analysis of perceived risk by hazard
Panel 1
R
2
beta R
2
beta R
2
beta R
2
beta
Model 0.26 *** 0.33 *** 0.38 *** 0.33 ***
Benefit (hazard) -0.06 -0.12 ** -0.16 *** -0.21 ***
Voluntariness (hazard) 0.07 0.15 *** 0.00 0.11 *
Immediacy (hazard) -0.04 -0.03 0.05 -0.02
knowledge to population (hazard) 0.13 ** 0.02 0.02 0.03
knowledge to science (hazard) -0.07 0.04 0.13 ** 0.02
Control (hazard) -0.06 -0.04 -0.09 * -0.03
Newness (hazard) -0.06 0.03 -0.02 0.02
Catastrophic potential (hazard) 0.10 * 0.12 ** -0.01 0.13 **
Dread (hazard) 0.17 *** 0.21 *** 0.15 *** 0.14 **
Severity (hazard) 0.29 *** 0.30 *** 0.38 *** 0.32 ***
Atttitude towards using the Internet 0.03 0.08 * -0.02 0.03
Length of Internet experience 0.02 0.03 0.11 ** 0.09 *
*p  < .05. **p  < .01. ***p  < .001
2 Identity theft 3 Internet surveillance 4 Virus1 Phishing
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(Table OSM1, continued) Panel 2
R
2
beta R
2
beta R
2
beta R
2
beta
Model 0.49 *** 0.35 *** 0.34 *** 0.33 ***
Benefit (hazard) -0.07 * -0.17 *** -0.15 ** -0.05
Voluntariness (hazard) 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.09 #
Immediacy (hazard) -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03
knowledge to population (hazard) 0.11 ** 0.05 0.00 0.05
knowledge to science (hazard) 0.00 -0.01 0.03 -0.03
Control (hazard) -0.04 -0.07 -0.10 * -0.03
Newness (hazard) -0.05 0.02 -0.01 0.05
Catastrophic potential (hazard) 0.09 * 0.06 0.15 *** 0.15 ***
Dread (hazard) 0.20 *** 0.08 0.09 0.13 **
Severity (hazard) 0.43 *** 0.34 *** 0.33 *** 0.36 ***
Atttitude towards using the Internet -0.04 0.10 * 0.06 0.09 *
Length of Internet experience 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.09 *
#p  = .05. *p  < .05. **p  < .01. ***p  < .001. 
5 Cookie 6 Spyware 7 Keylogger 8 Trojan
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(Table OSM1, continued) Panel 3
R
2
beta R
2
beta R
2
beta R
2
beta
Model 0.32 *** 0.27 *** 0.47 *** 0.39 ***
Benefit (hazard) -0.08 -0.05 -0.12 ** -0.07
Voluntariness (hazard) 0.07 0.09 0.09 * -0.03
Immediacy (hazard) 0.00 -0.08 0.00 0.02
knowledge to population (hazard) 0.05 -0.01 0.04 0.01
knowledge to science (hazard) 0.04 0.16 ** 0.06 0.04
Control (hazard) -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 0.03
Newness (hazard) 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.01
Catastrophic potential (hazard) 0.16 *** 0.11 * 0.09 * 0.09 *
Dread (hazard) 0.14 ** 0.05 0.01 0.17 ***
Severity (hazard) 0.34 *** 0.35 *** 0.50 *** 0.51 ***
Atttitude towards using the Internet 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.03
Length of Internet experience 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.10 **
*p  < .05. **p  < .01. ***p  < .001
12 E-mail-harvesting9 Botnet 10 Rogueware 11 Zero-day attack
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(Table OSM1, continued) Panel 4
R
2
beta R
2
beta R
2
beta R
2
beta
Model 0.33 *** 0.22 *** 0.36 *** 0.29 ***
Benefit (hazard) -0.09 * -0.15 ** -0.14 ** -0.02
Voluntariness (hazard) 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.11 *
Immediacy (hazard) 0.06 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05
knowledge to population (hazard) 0.06 0.03 0.04 -0.02
knowledge to science (hazard) -0.06 -0.05 0.02 -0.02
Control (hazard) -0.03 -0.10 * -0.03 -0.08
Newness (hazard) -0.03 0.00 0.04 -0.03
Catastrophic potential (hazard) 0.12 ** 0.13 ** 0.04 0.12 **
Dread (hazard) 0.18 *** 0.10 * 0.14 ** 0.05
Severity (hazard) 0.40 *** 0.29 *** 0.37 *** 0.43 ***
Atttitude towards using the Internet -0.06 0.04 0.12 ** -0.04
Length of Internet experience -0.14 *** -0.04 0.05 -0.04
*p  < .05. **p  < .01. ***p  < .001
13 Virtual stalking 14 Cyber-bullying 15 Social engineering 16 Cat-fishing
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